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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs.-

Case No.
11723

JOHN RICHARD MARK MILLER,

Defendan t-Appe Hant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Appellant, John Richard Mark Miller, appeals
from a conviction of issuing a check against insufficient funds in Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On the 17th day of March, 1969, appellant, John
Richard Mdrk Miller, was found guilty of issuing a
check against insufficient funds by a jury in Third
Court, Salt Lake County, Utah; whereupon,
appGllant, on the 7th day of April, 1969, appeared
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before the Honorable Merrill C. Faux, District Court
for sentencing, and appellant was sentenced to the
Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term as provided by law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction, a
setting aside of the sentence and an order awarding
a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 16, 1968, defendant, John Richard
Mark Miller, wrote a check (State's Ex. 1) for $95.00
against Walker Bank & Trust Co., University Branch,
Salt Lake City, to the Deseret Inn, Salt Lake City,
Utah, in settlement of a bi.11 for the motel's services
and some cash. (T. 52) The check was written in the
presence of the motel's employee, Erma Gelruth,
(T-52) and it was later returned. (T-52) Further, it was
established that no account existed at the Walker
Bank, Sugarhouse Branch in January, 1968, in the
name of John R. Miller or J. R. Miller. (T-61) Also, ac·
cording to Harry Croyle, Operations Officer at the
involved bank, and based on the account number
of State's Ex. 1, an account had existed for J. R. Miller but was closed by the bank in May, 1966. However, theJast account in that bank held by the name
of J. R. Miller was in May of 1967.
According to the defendant's version of the facts
he was at the Deseret Inn Motel and wrote the check
in question for the payment of his bill. (T-79) He had
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ooened the account involved in the summer of
i 965, but was unaware of its being closed until January, 1968, when a M:r. Glad informed him the account was closed. (T-80) However, the defendant
had received a check for $347 previous to January
16, 1968, and having endorsed the same asked Mr.
Glad to deposit $?.00 i:1 the account and bring the
balance of cash to him.
Mr. Miller endeavored to inform the court and
jury what he believed had happened to the mortey
and why it was not deposited but was denied an opportunity to do so. See proceedings (T-83-85). ·
Defendant submitted two instructions bearing
on the question of intent to defraud, (T-26, 27) which
the court refused to give, to which counsel duly excepted. IT-102)
ISSUE I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS INVOLVING INTENT TO DEFRAUD AS RELATED TO THIS CASE.

By the terms of 76-20-11 Utah Code Ann. 1953
(as a.mended) it is
for any person, with intent to defraud, to utter a check when at the drawing of such check he knows he has not sufficient
funds to pay the draft in full upon its presentation
for payment. It is recognized in the State of Utah
that the mere fact funds are not in an account at the
writing of a check, though prima facie evidence of
intent, is not conclusive evidence of an intent to de-
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fraud, and efforts by a defendant to place funds to
cover the draft at the time of presentment may be
considered tc negate the presumption of intent to defraud. State t'. Coleman, 17 Utah 2d 166, 406 P.2d 308
(1965) The instructions given by the court imply that
the writing of a check at a time one realizes his account has not the amount of funds written in the
draft is all that is necessary in the crime of insufficient funds. Defendant's instructions would have
properly clarified the law as stated in Coleman, supra
and informed the jury of its duty to consider defendant' s attempt to meet his obligation on the draft;
a failure to give the same was error.
In Coleman, supra the Supreme Court dismissed a
conviction against defendant for an insufficient
funds check where the evidence showed defendant
placed funds in his acocunt to cover a check after
it was written, though the funds were inadequate at
the time of presentment. However, the court did
recognize that the trial court's instruction to the jury,
that one who had no funds and knowledge of no
funds at the writing of the check was guilty of the
crime, was an improper statement of the law. In
the instant case, the defendant offered evidence of
efforts to place funds in the bank to cover the check
written. However, the courts instructions involving
this offense as set forth in numbers 9, 10, and 11,
(T-19, 20, 21 respectively) when read together leave
the impression that a lack of funds and a knowledge
of such lack of funds at the time of the writing of the
draft is all that is required for the offense. Paragraphs
3 and 4 of instruction 11 make reference to ". . . the
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payment of said check upon its presentation at said
bank ... "; however, each paragraph is referenced to
paragraph 1, which sets forth the time of the writing,
and consequently, it is not clear whether the jury
should or m-:iy consider all the factors involved, including those occurring after the writing of the draft.
Had the court gra_nted defendant's requested instructions T-26 and 27, it would have been clear to
the jury that defendant's story, if believed, could
h0ve beer;. considered to negate the presumption
of intent to defraud. However because of the court's
failure to so do, the jurv was left with an erroneous
impression of the law i.e. that mere lack of funds
and knowledqe thereof at the time of writing constitutes the crime. Certainly this is not the law in
Utah. State v. Coleman, supra.
ISSUE II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
ALLOW DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY AS TO INFORMATION HE RECEIVED REGARDING HIS CHECKING
ACCOUNT IN THAT SUCH TESTIMONY WAS OFFERED FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXPLAINING DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT AND NOT TO ASSERT THE
TRUTH OF THE STATEMENTS MADE.

As a general rule of evidence, involving hearsay, one may not testify as to non-judicial statements
of others where such assert the truth of the statement made. 29 Arn. Jur. 2d 555, § 497. However, where
one seeks to give evidence of another's statement to
explain his conduct and good faith in relation to
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that statement, such is regarded as original and ma.
terial evidence, and the same is not hearsay, and
is admissable. Allsfote lns11ran.ce Co. v. Godwin, 426
S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App. 1968); Thruway Service City Inc.
v. Townsend. 116 Ga. App. 379, 157 S.E.2d 564 (1967);
31A C,J.S. 676, 6'77 § 257; Jones on Evidence, Civil
Cases, 3rd Ed. § 330. During the course of trial defendant Miller attempted to explain what information he received about his checking account to explain not only his state of mind at the time of the
writing but also to explain his conduct following the
receipt of such information. (T-83-85) The court's refusal to allow such testimony was error and prejudicial to the defendant's case.
In Allstate Insurance Co. supra, plaintiff at trial was
allowed to testify, over defendant's objection, that
her supervisor had explained plaintiff's medica-1 expenses, resulting from an on-the-job injury, would
be covered. Such was entered by plaintiff to explain her reason for waiting several months before
cornmencing an action for damages against de£endant insurance company. On appeal, the court
of appeals upheld the admissibility of the plaintiff's
testimony as to another's statement and adopted the
rule of Jones on Evidence, Civil Cases, 3rd Ed.§ 330:
Where the question is whether a party has acted
prudently, wisely, or in good faith, the information on which he acted, whether true or false,
is original and material evidence, and not hearsay.
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Plaintiff's testimony as to phone conversations
held with defendant's agents following damage to
plaintiff's truck, caused by negligence of defendant's
agents, was held 6.dmissable in Thruway Ser,vice City
Inc., supra, to explain plaintiff's conduct, and was
ruled not to be hearsay. Defendant"s agents had
filled plaintiff's diesel truck with gasoline, and plaintiff was allowed to show he had his engine torn
down for an estimation of damage at the suggestion
of defendant's agents. In 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 257
pp. 676-677, the following is found:
Where a person's knowledge of a particular fact
is relevant, it may be shown that an unswom
statement of another person as to its existence
was brought to his attention in the same way
that any other relevant statement may be
shown to have been made to him. . . . A witness may testify as to statements made to him
by another, to establish lack of knowledge of
the witness as to certain matters.

Defendant was deprived of an opportunity to
explain his good faith at the time of writing the
check in question, or in other words to explain how
he first learned his account was closed. Further, he
was denied the chance to explain the information
he received regarding his account which in tum
would clarify his subsequent conduct. Based upon
thi:: authorities cited, such evidence was material and
0 dmlssable, and to deny its admissibility was error.
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoin.g reasons defendant's conviction should be reversed, the sentence set aside, and
a new trial awarded.
Respectfully submitted,
JAY V. BARNEY

231 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant

